We have two major problems, as Canadians. Firstly, we have a tendency to be too modest and not give ourselves credit for our achievements. Secondly, we tend to be too trusting — even naive — and too quick to forgive. All of these were on display throughout the Arrow saga.
Through the development, Canada consistently pushed boundaries, had recorded world-firsts, and set standards that were later adopted by virtually every subsequent design; and this, all in a single design. We looked for outside solutions, and there were none that met the requirements, either in existence or in any stage of development, so it was felt that we had to design it for ourselves, and we did. It worked, and not only satisfied the specifications, but went well beyond in a number of respects.
Costs were certainly a consideration, but many of the most disastrous overruns were the fault of other related projects not directly under the control of Avro, or of changing requirements. Even then, the programme would not have bankrupt the country. Were it not for the utter naïveté (to put it mildly) of those in the Diefenbaker government, we would have fared much better in a number of respects. What happened was not due to cost, but government ineptitude, gullibility and short-sightedness.
What we then ended up with is that we paid more, when everything is considered, for the BOMARC/SAGE and U.S.-made jets ($1.2 billion), compared to the all-in completion cost of the CF-105 programme, including 120 jets delivered ($1.1 billion). We haplessly contributed to the U.S. bail-out of Boeing by buying an ineffective, obsolete system that never really worked as advertised, compromised on our defence, and decimated our own industry. What we gave up in doing so is incalculable.
This is relevant because our “friends” to the south have been routinely trying to railroad us into doing what benefits them, and this continues now — including with the F-35 acquisition. Canada did buy the F-35; 16 of them (if Lockheed Martin can ever deliver). Any more than that has yet to be determined, unless there is something our government isn’t telling us. However, to make any additional commitment to the programme even modestly palatable — in the current climate, and given our shared history on such matters — I have to expect that some substantial concessions would have to be extracted.
When you consider the history and the tactics repeatedly used against us, how can there not be lingering anti-Diefenbaker sentiment and some level of animosity toward our neighbours.
