Dks01 The badmouthing of the BOMARC is largely tied up in the nuclear politics of Diefenbaker and Pearson. If more fully developed it would have been a credible anti ICBM defence.
It’s not just political; it had some deal-breaking shortcomings. It was also never designed to be an anti-ICBM system; it was a system against incoming “manned bombers”, and had limitations there, too. For instance, it couldn’t track moving targets well, post-launch. Once a missile was fired, if the bomber took aggressive evasive action, it would miss. I don’t know if they ever compensated for that (or if they could at all). The U.S. intended to conduct anti-ICMB R&D post-BOMARC, and wanted our participation in that, too.
By the time BOMARC was being installed in Canada, they had curtailed their use and declared it obsolete. Mission accomplished; they saved Boeing, and twisted our arms to help them pay for it (that wasn’t just a Conservative decision). Diefenbaker’s people had to insist that they keep production going long enough to deliver the system that we had been compelled to order.
The only interesting part of the whole mess was the AN/FSQ-7 computer that powered SAGE, designed by MIT and built mostly by IBM. The problem is that they installed those 3-megawatt behemoths in above-ground concrete buildings, making them vulnerable in a number of ways. Even then, SAGE had its limitations and other vulnerabilities.
Also, the BOMARC B units that we ended up with only had nuclear warheads, and they remained in U.S. custody unless needed and authorised. We couldn’t deploy the thing promptly without quite a procedure to arm it.